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war taxes was quite different. It was not based on economic considerations but on Germany's war aims, which at that time included a war indemnity. Nowhere in the three volumes have we any inkling of this, and it is everywhere denied by implication. Yet in presenting his budget to the Reichstag on March 10, 1915, Dr. Helfferich explained proudly and frankly that taxation was unnecessary since "this war is not being waged for the present but above all for the future and because we hold fast to the hope that we shall at the conclusion of peace be able to present to our enemies the bill for the war that has been forced upon us" (*An das Deutsche Volk: die Reichstagsreden des Kanzlers und des Schatzsekretärs*, Berlin, Carl Heymanns, p. 63).

Such seemingly deliberate suppression of the truth and of his own previously recorded opinions tends to make us feel that Dr. Helfferich's history is not merely prejudiced but that its author is lacking in that intellectual probity which must ever be the first quality of the historian.

CHRISTIAN GAUSS.

Erinnerungen. Von ALFRED VON TIRPITZ. (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler. 1919. Pp. xii, 526.)¹

THE desire on the part of former leaders of German opinion to report themselves and their causes aright is responsible for a number of recent volumes which vary in sincerity and reliability. In the case of Tirpitz's *Erinnerungen* the conclusion forces itself upon us that, though probably sincere, they are hardly reliable and as history are valuable only on incidental matters. This statement must, however, be modified with regard to the earlier section, dealing with the period from 1866 to about 1905, for the story of Tirpitz is largely the story of the German navy. No one understood it more thoroughly or was more responsible for its later development than he. He was a close student of naval affairs, and until questions of controversy begin to bulk large, he is an interesting and fairly trustworthy guide on German naval policy.

A thorough believer in the Prussian tradition, he understood only the policy of bluff and force. His work is an astonishing mixture of arrogance and childish petulance. He writes in an attitude of *impenitentia ultima* and retires from the stage shaking his fist at "perfidious Albion", which once having been a friend, then out of envy, after 1896, became an implacable enemy, and having cunningly stimulated France's desire for revenge and Russia's jealousy, finally succeeded in setting the world against peaceful Germany.

Aside from his hatred of England, Tirpitz's master-passion at present is the desire to justify himself. This results in an odd distribution of space and in some rather striking omissions in his correspondence. Although 188 of his large pages deal with the war, only twenty-six are

¹ An English translation, under the title *My Memoirs*, has been published by Dodd, Mead, and Company.

devoted to the events after March 17, 1916, the date of Tirpitz's removal from the cabinet. One hundred and ten pages are devoted to his *Kriegsbriefe*, of which one was written almost every day from headquarters at Charleville. Yet we notice a gap from May 13 to July 13, 1915. The letters of this period would naturally have contained the reactions on the *Lusitania's* sinking. Evidently Tirpitz did not wish to have them preserved, and the letters contain no mention of this success or blunder of the submarines.

Students who have wondered about Tirpitz's influence on German affairs will find the answer given here quite naively. It is evident that after 1911 (Agadir) he was at daggers drawn with Bethmann-Hollweg. The Kaiser likewise did not trust his judgment and was present at Tirpitz's interview with Haldane, whom Tirpitz treats as a Machiavellian politician who was trying to render Germany defenseless and place her at the mercy of England. Tirpitz was evidently the *enfant terrible* of the cabinet. Bethmann-Hollweg accused him of undermining the chancellor's influence and standing, and in spite of Tirpitz's denial, the letters show that the accusation was justified. The Kaiser would evidently have been relieved to have been rid of him but did not dare dismiss him because of his popularity as the creator and symbol of the navy. In the cabinet Tirpitz's influence however seems to have been virtually *nil*.

He did not approve the method in which the submarine decree of February, 1915, was promulgated with its warning to neutrals, and would have preferred an announcement of the submarine blockade of the mouth of the Thames and adjoining regions, which would gradually have been extended. He tells us in his *Erinnerungen* proper that the *Lusitania* was armed and sank as a result of the explosion of the munitions she carried. He believes the war would have been won if unrestricted submarine warfare had been declared in 1916. To him his fellows in the cabinet and in the direction of the navy, Bethmann-Hollweg, Jagow, von Pohl, etc., were incompetent epigones. He confesses that he himself would have accepted the chancellorship, which may explain much. Later he was for Hindenburg.

CHRISTIAN GAUSS.

Die Oberste Heeresleitung, 1914-1916, in ihren wichtigsten Entschliessungen. Von ERICH VON FALKENHAYN. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und Sohn. 1920. Pp. viii, 252.)

FOR the student of the Great War, there could hardly be a more alluring title than *General Headquarters and its Critical Decisions*. It promises a kind of enlightenment which perhaps no research elsewhere would afford; "inside" information as to the plans and projects, the calculations and expectations on which the principal operations were based, and competent *critiques* of their execution. The work itself is a memoir, rather than a history. It makes no references to authorities,